Annual Bergen Philosophy of Science Workshop
Main content
2024
Richard Dawid (Stockholm). Unification and Surprise: How Unification gets confirmatory
Jingyi Wu (LSE). Rigor Capture
Michael Miller (Toronto). Precision and Determinacy
Luna de Souter (Bergen). Restoring Reductiveness in Regularity Theories of Causation
Sam Flecther (Oxford). The Limits of Approximation
Daniele Molinini (Bologna). Mapping‑Based Accounts of Applicability and Converse Applications
Karen Crowther (Oslo). Why do we want a theory of quantum gravity?
Monica Solomon (Bilkent). The Road Less Traveled to the Distinction between Absolute and Relative Motion: Newton’s De Motu manuscripts
James Fraser (IHPST Paris) Laws of Nature on Different Scales
2023
Sam Schindler (Aarhus):ÌýTwo types of discovery: Nobel meets Kuhn
Elena Popa (Krakow, Jagiellonian Univ.):ÌýCausality, Evidence, and Local Psychiatric Knowledge: A Case for PluralismÌý
Rose Trappes (Exeter):ÌýBehaviour as Disposition or InteractionÌý
Veli Pekka Parkkinen (Bergen):ÌýUnique identifiability assumptions in methods and philosophy of causal enquiry.Ìý
Daniel Kostic (Leiden):ÌýPragmatics for Explainable AI
Cyrille Imbert (Univ. Lorraine):ÌýThe Cognitive and Social Process of Computing Pseudo-Random Numbers for Scientific Applications: Ingredients for a Reliability Crisis
Lorenzo Casini (Lucca/LMU):ÌýHigh-level Causation and Causal Inference (w/ A. Moneta)Ìý
- Henrik Røed Sherling (Cambridge) & Benjamin Chin-Yee (Cambridge):ÌýClinical Communication: A Model for Scientific Assertion?Ìý
- Benedetta Spigola (Lisbon):ÌýWhat is it like to be a conservation law? Between laws and principlesÌý
- Johannes Nyström (Stockholm):ÌýPredictive success and theoretical stability: on the soundness of the two-variable no-miracles argumentÌý
- Aditya Jha (Cambridge):ÌýOn the Continuum Fallacy: Is Temperature a Continuous Function?
- Andrei Marasoiu (Bucharest):ÌýRepresentation and design in network models of category deficitsÌý
2022
- Chris Smeenk (Univ. of Western Ontario): Fuzzy Modularity and Crucial Simulations (Joint work with Marie Gueguen, Rennes)
- Nic Fillion (Simon Fraser Univ.): The argument view of computer simulations done right
- Ana-Maria Cretu (Bristol Univ.): Human Computers as InstrumentsÌý
- Elay Shech (Auburn Univ.): Are Mesoscale Structures Natural Kinds? Reconsidering Batterman’s Middle Way
- Vincent Ardourel (IHPST Paris): The reduction of hydrodynamics and singular limits
- Siska de Baerdemaeker (Stockholm Univ.): Into the Unknown. Exploring Dark Matter with Stellar Streams
- Alex Franklin (King's College London): Incoherent? No, Just Decoherent. How Quantum Many Worlds Emerge
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2021
- Samir Okasha (Bristol):ÌýIs there a Bayesian justification of hypothetico-deductive inference?Ìý(Joint work with Karim Thebault, Bristol)
- Jessica Wilson (Toronto):ÌýIn Defense of CountabilismÌý(Joint work with David Builes, Princeton)
- Alastair Wilson (Birmingham):ÌýTheoretical Relicts: Progress, Reduction, and AutonomyÌý(Joint work with Katie Robertson, Birmingham)
- Chris Pincock (Ohio State Univ.): Defending Selective Scientific Realism
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2020
- Roman FriggÌý(LSE):ÌýModelling Nature: the DEKI AccountÌý(Talk based on joint work with James Nguyen, LSE)
- Dana JalobeanuÌý(Bucharest):ÌýBaconianism and Newtonianism: a history (and philosophy) of shifting historiographic categories
- Jo WolffÌý(Edinburgh):ÌýMaking concepts measurable
- Richard DawidÌý(Stockholm):ÌýHow postmodern is cosmic inflation?Ìý(Based on joint work withÌýCasey McCoy, Yonsei Univ.)
- Karim ThebaultÌý(Bristol):ÌýPoincaré, Dark Energy, and the Deadly Robots of KrikkitÌý(Based on work withÌýSean Gryb, Groningen)
- Karen CrowtherÌý(Oslo):ÌýThe Role of Singularities in the Search for Quantum GravityÌý(Joint work withÌýSebastian De Haro, Amsterdam)
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2019Ìý
- Denis Walsh (Toronto):ÌýThe Developmental Imperative
- James Ladyman (Bristol):ÌýWhat if anything is fundamental about physics?
- Patricia Palacios (Salzburg):ÌýIntertheoretic Reduction in Physics Beyond the Nagelian Model
- Axel Gelfert (Berlin):ÌýExplanation and Exploration in the Science of Pattern Formation
- Laura Franklin-Hall (NYU):ÌýWhy are some kinds historical and others not?
2018
- P. Kyle Stanford (UC Irvine):ÌýA Difference that Makes a Difference: Howard Stein on Realism, Instrumentalism, and Intellectually Nourishing Snacks
- Kirsten Walsh (Nottingham):ÌýInventing Units of Measurement: Causal Reasoning in Newton's Optics
- Dirk Schlimm (McGill):ÌýTowards a cognitive and pragmatic account of notations for propositional logic
- Mark Colyvan (University of Sydney and the Ludwig Maximilians University, Munich):ÌýAnalogical Reasoning via Mathematical Models
- Adrian Curie (Cambridge):ÌýHow are moa like sheep? Pursuit and value in science
- Julie Zahle (Bergen):ÌýData, Epistemic Values, and Multiple Methods in Case Study Research
- Alan Baker (Swarthmore):ÌýMapping Mathematics to the World
2017
- Stathis Psillos (Univ. of Athens):ÌýLaws and Powers in the Frame of Nature
- Alexander Bird (Univ. of Bristol):ÌýIs there meta-scientific knowledge? Against both the no-miracles argument and the pessimistic induction
- Gordon Belot (Univ. of Michigan, Ann Arbor):ÌýGravity and GRACE: Does Underdetermination Undermine Objectivity?
- Laura Ruetsche (Univ. of Michigan, Ann Arbor):ÌýRenormalization Group Realism: An Unduly Skeptical Review
- Michael Baumgartner (Univ. of Geneva / Univ. of Bergen):ÌýBoolean difference-making: A modern regularity theory of causation
- Eleanor Knox (King's College London):ÌýSpacetime Functionalism
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2016
- Carl Hoefer (ICREA / Barcelona):ÌýCurrent Great Theory Realism
- Stephanie Ruphy (Grenoble):ÌýPluralist challenges to a science-based metaphysics
- Jamie Tappenden (U. Michigan, Ann Arbor):ÌýFrege, Carl Snell and Romanticism; Fruitful Concepts and the 'Organic/Mechanical' Distinction
- Sam Schindler (Aarhus):ÌýPrediction and testability
- James Conant (Chicago):ÌýThomas Kuhn on Problems and Puzzles
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2015
- Mark Steiner (Hebrew Univ. of Jerusalem):ÌýThe Silent Revolution of Wittgenstein in the Philosophy of Mathematics, 1937
- Catherine Wilson (York Univ. UK):ÌýThe 'Hard Problem' of Consciousness: Scientific Explanation and Philosophical Ineffability
- Juha Saatsi (Leeds Univ.):ÌýEmergence and Explanation
- Mary Leng (York Univ.):ÌýMathematical Realism and Naturalism
- Anjan Chakravartty (Notre Dame Univ.):ÌýProperty Ontology in Fundamental Physics
- Øystein Linnebo (Univ. of Oslo):ÌýMathematics and Inference to the Best Explanation
2014
- Robert Batterman (Pittsburgh):ÌýMinimal Model ExplanationsÌý
- Michael Moreau (Tromsø):ÌýMr. Fit, Mr. Simplicity and Mr. Scope: from Social Choice to Theory Choice in Science
- Dennis Dieks (Utrecht):ÌýEmergence, Reduction, Underdetermination and Explanation in Recent Quantum Gravity ResearchÌý
- Mauricio Suarez (London / Madrid):ÌýPropensities, Chances, and Experimental StatisticsÌý
- Mark Sprevak (Edinburgh):ÌýFictionalism about Neural RepresentationsÌý
- Anouk Barberousse (Lille / Paris):ÌýBayesian Methods in Climate Modeling
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2013
- Margaret Morrison (Univ. of Toronto):ÌýInconsistent Models: Problems and Perspectives
- Wendy Parker (Durham Univ.,ÌýUK):ÌýSimulation, Measurement & the Construction of Global Climate Datasets
- Michal Walicki (Univ. of Bergen, Institute of Informatics):ÌýThe holism of truth and paradoxÌý(joint work with Sjur Dyrkolbotn)
- Alexander Paseau (Oxford Univ.):ÌýKnowledge of Mathematics Without Proof
- Rani L. Anjum (Norwegian Univ. of Life Sciences UMB)ÌýandÌýStephen Mumford (Durham):ÌýCausation, Powers and Probability (joint work)
- Colin Howson (LSE / Toronto):ÌýThe Importance of Being Bayesian
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