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BPSW

Annual Bergen Philosophy of Science Workshop

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2024

  • Richard Dawid (Stockholm). Unification and Surprise: How Unification gets confirmatory

  • Jingyi Wu (LSE). Rigor Capture

  • Michael Miller (Toronto). Precision and Determinacy

  • Luna de Souter (Bergen). Restoring Reductiveness in Regularity Theories of Causation

  • Sam Flecther (Oxford). The Limits of Approximation

  • Daniele Molinini (Bologna). Mapping‑Based Accounts of Applicability and Converse Applications

  • Karen Crowther (Oslo). Why do we want a theory of quantum gravity?

  • Monica Solomon (Bilkent). The Road Less Traveled to the Distinction between Absolute and Relative Motion: Newton’s De Motu manuscripts

  • James Fraser (IHPST Paris) Laws of Nature on Different Scales

2023

  • Sam Schindler (Aarhus):ÌýTwo types of discovery: Nobel meets Kuhn

  • Elena Popa (Krakow, Jagiellonian Univ.):ÌýCausality, Evidence, and Local Psychiatric Knowledge: A Case for PluralismÌý

  • Rose Trappes (Exeter):ÌýBehaviour as Disposition or InteractionÌý

  • Veli Pekka Parkkinen (Bergen):ÌýUnique identifiability assumptions in methods and philosophy of causal enquiry.Ìý

  • Daniel Kostic (Leiden):ÌýPragmatics for Explainable AI

  • Cyrille Imbert (Univ. Lorraine):ÌýThe Cognitive and Social Process of Computing Pseudo-Random Numbers for Scientific Applications: Ingredients for a Reliability Crisis

  • Lorenzo Casini (Lucca/LMU):ÌýHigh-level Causation and Causal Inference (w/ A. Moneta)Ìý

  • Henrik Røed Sherling (Cambridge) & Benjamin Chin-Yee (Cambridge):ÌýClinical Communication: A Model for Scientific Assertion?Ìý
  • Benedetta Spigola (Lisbon):ÌýWhat is it like to be a conservation law? Between laws and principlesÌý
  • Johannes Nyström (Stockholm):ÌýPredictive success and theoretical stability: on the soundness of the two-variable no-miracles argumentÌý
  • Aditya Jha (Cambridge):ÌýOn the Continuum Fallacy: Is Temperature a Continuous Function?
  • Andrei Marasoiu (Bucharest):ÌýRepresentation and design in network models of category deficitsÌý

2022

  • Chris Smeenk (Univ. of Western Ontario): Fuzzy Modularity and Crucial Simulations (Joint work with Marie Gueguen, Rennes)
  • Nic Fillion (Simon Fraser Univ.): The argument view of computer simulations done right
  • Ana-Maria Cretu (Bristol Univ.): Human Computers as InstrumentsÌý
  • Elay Shech (Auburn Univ.): Are Mesoscale Structures Natural Kinds? Reconsidering Batterman’s Middle Way
  • Vincent Ardourel (IHPST Paris): The reduction of hydrodynamics and singular limits
  • Siska de Baerdemaeker (Stockholm Univ.): Into the Unknown. Exploring Dark Matter with Stellar Streams
  • Alex Franklin (King's College London): Incoherent? No, Just Decoherent. How Quantum Many Worlds Emerge
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2021

  • Samir Okasha (Bristol):ÌýIs there a Bayesian justification of hypothetico-deductive inference?Ìý(Joint work with Karim Thebault, Bristol)
  • Jessica Wilson (Toronto):ÌýIn Defense of CountabilismÌý(Joint work with David Builes, Princeton)
  • Alastair Wilson (Birmingham):ÌýTheoretical Relicts: Progress, Reduction, and AutonomyÌý(Joint work with Katie Robertson, Birmingham)
  • Chris Pincock (Ohio State Univ.): Defending Selective Scientific Realism
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2020

  • Roman FriggÌý(LSE):ÌýModelling Nature: the DEKI AccountÌý(Talk based on joint work with James Nguyen, LSE)
  • Dana JalobeanuÌý(Bucharest):ÌýBaconianism and Newtonianism: a history (and philosophy) of shifting historiographic categories
  • Jo WolffÌý(Edinburgh):ÌýMaking concepts measurable
  • Richard DawidÌý(Stockholm):ÌýHow postmodern is cosmic inflation?Ìý(Based on joint work withÌýCasey McCoy, Yonsei Univ.)
  • Karim ThebaultÌý(Bristol):ÌýPoincaré, Dark Energy, and the Deadly Robots of KrikkitÌý(Based on work withÌýSean Gryb, Groningen)
  • Karen CrowtherÌý(Oslo):ÌýThe Role of Singularities in the Search for Quantum GravityÌý(Joint work withÌýSebastian De Haro, Amsterdam)
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2019Ìý

  • Denis Walsh (Toronto):ÌýThe Developmental Imperative
  • James Ladyman (Bristol):ÌýWhat if anything is fundamental about physics?
  • Patricia Palacios (Salzburg):ÌýIntertheoretic Reduction in Physics Beyond the Nagelian Model
  • Axel Gelfert (Berlin):ÌýExplanation and Exploration in the Science of Pattern Formation
  • Laura Franklin-Hall (NYU):ÌýWhy are some kinds historical and others not?


2018

  • P. Kyle Stanford (UC Irvine):ÌýA Difference that Makes a Difference: Howard Stein on Realism, Instrumentalism, and Intellectually Nourishing Snacks
  • Kirsten Walsh (Nottingham):ÌýInventing Units of Measurement: Causal Reasoning in Newton's Optics
  • Dirk Schlimm (McGill):ÌýTowards a cognitive and pragmatic account of notations for propositional logic
  • Mark Colyvan (University of Sydney and the Ludwig Maximilians University, Munich):ÌýAnalogical Reasoning via Mathematical Models
  • Adrian Curie (Cambridge):ÌýHow are moa like sheep? Pursuit and value in science
  • Julie Zahle (Bergen):ÌýData, Epistemic Values, and Multiple Methods in Case Study Research
  • Alan Baker (Swarthmore):ÌýMapping Mathematics to the World


2017

  • Stathis Psillos (Univ. of Athens):ÌýLaws and Powers in the Frame of Nature
  • Alexander Bird (Univ. of Bristol):ÌýIs there meta-scientific knowledge? Against both the no-miracles argument and the pessimistic induction
  • Gordon Belot (Univ. of Michigan, Ann Arbor):ÌýGravity and GRACE: Does Underdetermination Undermine Objectivity?
  • Laura Ruetsche (Univ. of Michigan, Ann Arbor):ÌýRenormalization Group Realism: An Unduly Skeptical Review
  • Michael Baumgartner (Univ. of Geneva / Univ. of Bergen):ÌýBoolean difference-making: A modern regularity theory of causation
  • Eleanor Knox (King's College London):ÌýSpacetime Functionalism
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2016

  • Carl Hoefer (ICREA / Barcelona):ÌýCurrent Great Theory Realism
  • Stephanie Ruphy (Grenoble):ÌýPluralist challenges to a science-based metaphysics
  • Jamie Tappenden (U. Michigan, Ann Arbor):ÌýFrege, Carl Snell and Romanticism; Fruitful Concepts and the 'Organic/Mechanical' Distinction
  • Sam Schindler (Aarhus):ÌýPrediction and testability
  • James Conant (Chicago):ÌýThomas Kuhn on Problems and Puzzles
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2015

  • Mark Steiner (Hebrew Univ. of Jerusalem):ÌýThe Silent Revolution of Wittgenstein in the Philosophy of Mathematics, 1937
  • Catherine Wilson (York Univ. UK):ÌýThe 'Hard Problem' of Consciousness: Scientific Explanation and Philosophical Ineffability
  • Juha Saatsi (Leeds Univ.):ÌýEmergence and Explanation
  • Mary Leng (York Univ.):ÌýMathematical Realism and Naturalism
  • Anjan Chakravartty (Notre Dame Univ.):ÌýProperty Ontology in Fundamental Physics
  • Øystein Linnebo (Univ. of Oslo):ÌýMathematics and Inference to the Best Explanation


2014

  • Robert Batterman (Pittsburgh):ÌýMinimal Model ExplanationsÌý
  • Michael Moreau (Tromsø):ÌýMr. Fit, Mr. Simplicity and Mr. Scope: from Social Choice to Theory Choice in Science
  • Dennis Dieks (Utrecht):ÌýEmergence, Reduction, Underdetermination and Explanation in Recent Quantum Gravity ResearchÌý
  • Mauricio Suarez (London / Madrid):ÌýPropensities, Chances, and Experimental StatisticsÌý
  • Mark Sprevak (Edinburgh):ÌýFictionalism about Neural RepresentationsÌý
  • Anouk Barberousse (Lille / Paris):ÌýBayesian Methods in Climate Modeling
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2013

  • Margaret Morrison (Univ. of Toronto):ÌýInconsistent Models: Problems and Perspectives
  • Wendy Parker (Durham Univ.,ÌýUK):ÌýSimulation, Measurement & the Construction of Global Climate Datasets
  • Michal Walicki (Univ. of Bergen, Institute of Informatics):ÌýThe holism of truth and paradoxÌý(joint work with Sjur Dyrkolbotn)
  • Alexander Paseau (Oxford Univ.):ÌýKnowledge of Mathematics Without Proof
  • Rani L. Anjum (Norwegian Univ. of Life Sciences UMB)ÌýandÌýStephen Mumford (Durham):ÌýCausation, Powers and Probability (joint work)
  • Colin Howson (LSE / Toronto):ÌýThe Importance of Being Bayesian

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